This article argues that Christians have strong faith-based reasons to avoid consuming animal products derived from animals that have not been allowed to flourish as fellow creatures of God, and that Christians should avoid participating in systems that disallow such flourishing. It considers and refutes objections to addressing this as an issue of Christian ethics, before drawing on a developed theological understanding of animal life in to argue that the flourishing of fellow animal creatures is of ethical concern for Christians. Since the vast majority of animal products currently available for purchase are derived from farmed animals reared in modern intensive modes that fail to allow for their flourishing, and this practice is harmful for humans and the environment as well as farmed animals, the article argues that Christians should avoid consuming these products.
I. Objections to a Christian food ethic treating the consumption of animals
We are rightly sceptical about ethical arguments for radical positions, so before presenting arguments in favour of my position, let me consider three potentially fatal points that would quickly defeat the argument I am seeking to develop.
First, it seems unlikely that the vast majority of Christians today and in past generations could be in error in failing to recognise that their faith required abstention from most animal products.
There is a strong and plausible argument from conservatism that should make us pause before accepting this judgement, and a parallel requirement on anyone advancing such a claim to provide an error theory explaining how things could have come to such a pass. My explanation for this is that the ways in which farmed animals are raised has changed radically and Christians, together with others, have been inattentive to these changes. I was shocked when I first came across the claim, not so long ago, that the first large-scale rearing of farmed animals exclusively for meat was in England in the late eighteenth century: up to that point meat was largely a by-product of keeping animals for other reasons, such as milk, eggs, and wool. Meat was a cash-crop made possible by the Highland clearances in Scotland and the enclosures in England, displacing the largely arable agriculture of the poor, and, as Percy Bysshe Shelley noted in 1813, causing wastage of food productivity 'absolutely incapable of calculation'. 2 The intensification of farmed animal production has developed over the past two hundred years since, but accelerated rapidly from the mid-twentieth century. Most farmed animals are now raised in ways that would be unrecognisable in comparison to conditions only a few decades ago. Broiler hens are a particular extreme example: bred through 
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4 artificial night and day, automated feeding and climate control, with human interaction restricted to a daily patrol to remove the dead, and finally stuffing them into crates for transport to slaughter. I still remember the experience of holding a straggly 16 day old hen in the midst of a huge broiler shed, surrounded by 26,000 of her fellows, with 23 similar sheds nearby, filled with the 600,000
birds that had been delivered together as day-old chicks two weeks previously. I had the strong sense that these animals were not being treated as animals, but as a crop, grown for harvest. The hen I held had only just lost her fluffy yellow chick feathers, yet was nearly halfway through her life.
Pigs fare little better: most are also raised indoors in crowded conditions where farmers often resort to cutting off their tails to reduce the injuries from aggression and boredom that such intelligent and socially complex animals experience in such a monotonous environment.
My point is that most of what now generates the need for radical changes in the Christian
ethics of consuming animals is radical changes in farmed animal practice -changes which the farming industry has understandably not been active in publicizing to consumers, and of which most consumers have therefore been unaware. Therefore, the act of eating chicken today is different ethically from the act of our grandparents eating chicken, which they did much less frequently because before the invention of broiler hens chicken was a luxury compared with cheaper alternatives such as beef. 3 My position does not imply a retrospective judgement that our grandparents were wrong in eating farmed animals, but that the nature of the industry now is that we almost always are. It is also helpful to note that my position is also not a retrospective 14 Genesis 1 gives humans dominion over other animals, but its specification of plants as food both for animals and humans, suggests that this dominion does not include the taking of their lives, and the peaceable coexistence of humans with the animals in Genesis 2 strengthens the case for a dominion that does not involve killing. After the fateful events of Genesis 3, and after the flood God causes in eventual response, God gives permission for the first time for humans to eat other animals provided they do not consume their life blood (Gen. 9.3-4), but we might well follow Luther and many other theologians in interpreting this as a departure from the ideal of Genesis 1, especially in the light of prophetic visions of an end to animal sacrifice and the Messianic reign bringing peace between humans and animals, and Paul's anticipation of the whole creation freed from its groaning bondage. 15 We should also question Augustine's use of the criterion of reason to identify creatures we may and may not kill: there are human beings not capable of reason whom we rightly wish to protect, and we need to recognise that the abundant examples of animal reasoning offered in contemporary animal studies -such as the politicking of chimpanzees, the abstract logic of parrots, the innovative tool-fashioning of crows, and the ability of dolphins to parse grammar, to take a few of myriad possible examples -mean the Greek idea of a binary divide between humans 14 Gen. 1.4a, 10b, 12b, 18b, 21b, 25b. 
II. Why the flourishing of farmed animals is a Christian concern
My project in On Animals Volume I was to set out where animals belong under the major Christian doctrines of creation, reconciliation, and redemption, and this is the foundation of my ethical argument for how Christians should think about the ethics of our relationships with animals. Here is a one-paragraph summary of the argument of the book:
Part I argued that creation is best understood as God's gracious bestowal of being on all creatures, both for their own sake and so that they may glorify God in their participation conflictual. We fear the snake and the wolf when they threaten us; we must prevent the rabbit and deer from destroying our crops in order that we may eat. But while we cannot escape our participation with other creatures in the groaning of this present age, and will never through our efforts be able to achieve an Edenic harmony with them, a Christian appreciation of animal creatures means we must nonetheless take care to walk among God's other animal creatures in awareness of their status as our fellows, seek to promote their flourishing when we can, and obstruct it only when we must.
One can imagine any number of religious or irreligious views of the world that justified a wholly anthropocentric ethic in which the entirety of the non-human universe was seen as mere material for the realization of human ends, available for exploitation without any restraint beyond that of what would most efficiently provide for human needs. Looking around us, we might well judge that, with some notable exceptions, our practice in relation to farmed animals is an embodied realization of such an ethic. This is not, however, a Christian way of construing our relationships with others of God's creatures. Christians worship a God who is creator of all creatures, gracious in providing for all creatures, who acted in Jesus Christ to reconcile all things in heaven and earth, as the opening of the letters to the Colossians and Ephesians remind us, and who will free creation from its bondage to enjoy the freedom of the children of God. Once we have seen all creation in this theological framework, we cannot avoid the recognition that in relation to the creatures most like us, our fellow animal creatures, who share with us a radical dependence on God and other creatures to provide the nutrients we need, and who share much of our vulnerability and fragility, we must act carefully and responsibly.
Such an attitude towards animals is deeply-rooted in Christian texts and traditions. Pope astonished to find that a hyena had been knocking on the door with her head. She held her puppy in her mouth, and offered the puppy to him, weeping. Macarius took the puppy in his hands and
looked to see what was the matter. He saw that the puppy was blind in both eyes. He took the puppy, groaned, spat on the puppy's face and signed it on the eyes with his finger. Immediately, the puppy could see, ran to his mother, suckled from her, and followed her away. The next day the hyena returned and knocked on the hermit's door again. This time when he opened it he saw she had a sheepskin in her mouth. He asked her where she had got the sheepskin, if she had not eaten a sheep, and told her that he would not take the sheepskin if it had come of violence. The hyena struck her head on the ground, bent her paws, and prayed on her knees for him to take it. He said he would not take it unless she promised not to harm the poor by eating their sheep, and she nodded her head as if she were promising him. Then he told her he would not take it unless she promised not to kill another creature, and said if she was hungry she should come to him and he would give her bread. The hyena bent, nodded, and looked him in the eye as if she were promising him. So
Macarius offered praises to God for giving understanding to the animals and letting Macarius come to understand God's ways. He took the sheepskin from the hyena and she went away. If I see a dog wounded at the side of the road, it is a Christian response, if possible, to take him to a place where he can be cared for. Interestingly in relation some other accounts of animal ethics, the Christian obligation not to pluck the wings from a fly or wash a spider down the drain does not depend on any prior judgement about the capacities of the creature concerned, but simply our recognition of them as fellow animal creatures of our God.
Let us take another example with relevance to the topic of this paper: the ethics of consuming animals. Currently, virtually all commercial egg production globally involves the sexing of chicks after they hatch, and then the culling of all male chicks, because they are obviously useless for egg production, and because they do not belong to the specialist strains bred for broiler sheds, they are also useless for meat. In the UK, most chicks are killed by maceration: being fed into a mincing machine. This is judged by animal welfare researchers to be one of the most humane methods for this culling available. 27 Globally, over 4 billion chicks are culled after hatching each year. 28 I contend that a system that so callously discards the lives of all male chicks in this way is clearly contrary to a Christian obligation not to obstruct the flourishing of fellow animal creatures. The system brings the chicks into being and then prevents their flourishing in the most absolute way possible. Jesus' teaching about sparrows, noted above must mean that not one of these billions of chicks is forgotten by God. The only justification that can be offered for the system is that it enables eggs to be produced and sold more cheaply than would otherwise be possible. The systematic culling is clearly not necessary as such, but is necessary only to produce eggs at a particular price point. If we reverted instead to the systems that obtained previously with breeds of chicken that were used for eggs and meat, the male chicks would be allowed to grow to maturity before slaughter. Here we have conflict between human and non-human interests of a sort: the older system was a less convenient method of obtaining eggs and meant consumers had to pay more for and organic eggs, are produced in ways contrary to a Christian understanding of our responsibilities towards other animals. 29 This is another example of the difference between Christian and other approaches to animal ethics: for a utilitarian approach, the killing of male chicks is morally irrelevant, provided no significant suffering is involved; for the leading animal rights theory of Tom Regan, the chicks fall well below his threshold for the possession of rights. 30 To understand the wrongness of killing all male chicks on hatching, we need a moral account that is teleological: able to give an account of what the lives of these chicks are for, as Christian theology can.
If we agree that the 35 day life of a broiler hen referred to above also prevents their adequate flourishing as fellow creatures, then most chicken is also off the menu for Christians. Poultry are by far the most numerous farmed animal, excluding fish: of the 77 billion animals killed for food in 29 The cages in which the vast majority of the hens not culled are confined globally and which equally clearly prevent their flourishing are an additional reason to avoid eggs from those sources.
There has been recent progress in the development of technology to sex chicks before hatching, 2013, 72.6 billion were poultry. 31 By far the most common mammal to be killed are pigs: 1.5 billion in 2013. 32 If, attending to what it would mean for a pig to flourish as a pig, we agree that keeping them in monotonous and crowded indoor sheds with slatted floors for the entirety of their lives, and confining sows to crates in which they cannot even turn around, that means that Christians should avoid most pork. If we agree that taking dairy calves from their mothers even before they suckle for the first time, and forcing dairy cows to produce milk at levels that require the constant eating of food concentrates, being kept indoors without ever having the opportunity to graze grass, and being culled for beef after 3 or 4 lactations when their yield drops, fails to allow dairy cows to flourish adequately as creatures of God, then an increasing proportion of milk and other dairy products should be avoided by Christians. Beef cattle, and sheep are generally raised extensively, and generally fare better than chickens and pigs, but lambs are slaughtered at 2-6 months without having the opportunity to grow to maturity because of a consumer preference for younger flesh, and sheep and cows are still often subject to painful procedures such as castration and branding without anaesthetic.
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We have seen that harms inflicted on farmed animals in intensive modes of production must be From the modest claim that Christians should be concerned about the flourishing of fellow animal creatures, through a summary survey of how modern intensive animal farming practices 34 Bernard E. Rollin, Farm Animal Welfare: Social, Bioethical, and Research Issues (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Press, 1995), pp. 74-5. 35 Bernard Rollin surveyed the options available in 1995 in Rollin, Farm Animal Welfare: Social, impact on animals, we have moved to the judgement that the vast majority of farmed animals are not raised in ways compatible with a Christian regard for them, and therefore that Christians should avoid supporting these unnecessarily cruel practices by not consuming products derived from them.
This would have a rapid and direct effect on farmed animals: any reduction in demand for the animal products of intensive farming would mean fewer animals would be caught up in such production systems, and the market for higher welfare alternatives would expand, resulting in more animals having the opportunity to flourish within farmed settings.
One obvious counter-argument to this position is that the human interest in having access to cheap animal products outweighs the costs to the animals farmed intensively, and the higher prices for animal products that would be the consequence of ending intensive farming would reduce access to animal products, especially for those on low incomes. There are two reasons that this objection fails to be convincing. In the first place, it is clear that consuming animal products at current levels is not a benefit to human beings at all. Reducing global meat consumption would significantly advance human food and water security, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reduce environmental pollution, reduce the risk of new human diseases, reduce the growth of antibiotic resistance, reduce the incidence of obesity and other dietary health problems, reduce the numbers of poor and migrant workers exploited in meat-packing plants and slaughterhouses, as well as reducing the numbers of animals subjected to the cruelty of intensive farming. 36 The substantial benefit in improving the welfare of farmed animals therefore brings even greater human benefits.
Second, while the particular impact of any change on those on low incomes should be a strong Christian concern, we do not reject regulation of other products on this ground. Safety standards for children's toys, minimum levels of pay for workers, and health and safety standards in factories all make products more expensive, but most agree that the higher prices that result represent the necessary costs of production, and should not be compromised in order to give those on low incomes better access to them. In a similar way, we should agree on appropriate standards for farmed animal welfare, and then make appropriate provision for a distribution of wealth that will allow appropriate access to these products, recognizing that current levels of production and consumption are unprecedented and unhealthy. Just as we should not put the lives of Bangladeshi garment workers at risk in order to permit the unsafe production of cheap clothes, so we should not continue our cruel treatment of farmed animals in order to mitigate unjust human income inequalities.
There are a range of other objections offered in relation to the argument that Christianity has strong implications for concern for animals. Some note that Jesus was not a vegetarian, so
Christians should have no concern about eating animals. This is a good argument against an absolute Christian vegetarianism that says it is now and always been wrong to kill animals for food, but does not provide grounds to judge it permissible to subject farmed animals to a poor life in order to make products derived from them cheaper, which is what is at stake in my argument here.
Others note that Jesus sent demons into the Gadarene swine (Matt. 8.28-33), but this story does not suggest that Jesus would have been unconcerned about the death of the pigs, and Michael Gilmour has even made the enticing suggestion recently that we could read this as a sacrificial action on the part of the pigs, cooperating with Jesus to ensure the demons were destroyed. 37 Others argue that if
God cares about gazelles, and this has relevance for ethics, it means we have an obligation to intervene to protect them from lions in the wild. This takes us back to the Christian recognition that we live in a fallen creation where we cannot bring peace between animal creatures, and where intervening to save prey from predators would result in the starvation of predators. We lament such conflicts, and look forward to the liberation of creation that will bring them to an end, but in the meantime should focus on the mistreatment of God's animal creatures that we are in a position to In conversation I am often reminded of the importance of offering and receiving hospitality, and the complexity of negotiating family and wider social relationships in the context of avoiding particular animal products. I agree that these are morally weighty considerations, and that flexibility is important as guest and host, but believe that if we recognise the importance of the issue to Christian faith, we can negotiate these complexities in the context of our relationships, and that this will become easier over time. We have deep habits and longstanding traditions involving the consumption of animal products, of course, and people often baulk at the prospect of having to reconsider them, but while intensively farmed meat, dairy, and eggs massively dominate the global market, it is possible to find small scale producers who farm animals that have been allowed to flourish as creatures of God, and it is also possible to relearn habits and remake traditional meals in ways that do not require animal products at all. Steps away from a diet involving products derived from intensively farmed animals can be slow and moderate: a meat-free meal, a meat-free day, a meat-free Lent, for example. Christian traditions of fasting and dietary traditions in monastic communities focussed around abstaining from meat, so attention to this element of our diet is by no means foreign to Christians. For some reason, the perfect seems to be the enemy of the better in this area of ethics, preventing small steps in the right direction. This is a logic we should resist: reducing the consumption of intensively farmed animal products will quickly reduce the numbers of farmed animals caught up in these systems, as well as having broader beneficial impacts on human food and water security, greenhouse gas emissions, environmental pollution, and human health.
III. Conclusion
I have argued that Christians have strong faith-based reasons to avoid consuming animal products derived from animals that have not been allowed to flourish as fellow creatures of God, and to avoid participating in systems that disallow such flourishing. I have also argued that modern intensive farming of animals, from which the vast majority of current animal products are derived, fails to allow animals to flourish as creatures of God. Taken together, these conclusions indicate that
Christians have reason to avoid most meat, dairy, and eggs currently offered for sale, and to avoid participating in its production.
It is striking that in nineteenth century Great Britain, Christians were at the vanguard of campaigns to introduce legislation against animal cruelty, were active in establishing what became the RSPCA, and at the end of the century led campaigns against vivisection. 38 There is recent precedent, therefore, for Christians recognizing that their faith has implications for the treatment of animals and acting in response, and perhaps it is a timely moment for Christians to reappropriate this as a faith issue, and recognise the implications for their own consumption, and for farming practice. 39 An important part of this work will be engaging with farmers, and Christian farmers in particular, to discuss with them what might constitute the adequate flourishing of the animals under their care.
For most of us eating animals has been an ordinary thing, without any particular relationship to our faith or ethical norms derived from it. It is clear, however, that this is a historical anomaly. In her paper in this issue of the journal, Ellen Davis reminds us that for the Levitical community sacrifice and meat-eating were personal and public, rather than impersonal and private. 40 That is, meat-eating in this community was extraordinary, rather than ordinary. This has been true much more generally: until recently, meat-eating was ordinary only for the very wealthy. I submit that we 38 Clough, On Animals II, ch. 2.
39 I founded the CreatureKind organization (http://becreaturekind.org) in 2015 to make the case to churches in the UK and North America that farmed animal welfare should be a faith concern.
40 Ellen F. Davis, 'Identity and Eating: A Christian Reading of Leviticus', Studies in Christian
